topics: |  cognitive | categorization

Excerpts

The Classical Theory:
Most concepts (esp. lexical concepts) are structured mental representations
that encode a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their
application, if possible, in sensory or perceptual terms.

Concept Acquisition in the Classical theory

If a concept is a complex representation built out of features that encode
necessary and sufficient conditions for its application, then the natural
model of concept acquisition is one where the learner acquires a concept by
assembling its features. If, in accordance with the empiricist version of the
Classical Theory, we add the further stipulation that primitive features are
sensory or perceptual, the model we arrive at is something like the
following. Through perception, sensory properties are monitored so that their
representations are joined in a way that reflects environmental
contingencies. Having noticed the way these properties correlate in her
environment, the learner assembles a complex concept that incorporates the
relevant features in such a way that something falls under the new, complex
concept just in case it satisfies those features. In this way, all concepts
in the end would be defined in terms of a relatively small stock of sensory
concepts. As John Locke put it in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(1690/1975, p. 166),
    [E]ven the most abstruse Ideas, how remote soever they may seem from
    Sense, or from any operation of our own Minds, are yet only such, as
    the Understanding frames to it self, by repeating and joining together
    Ideas, that it had either from Objects of Sense, or from its own
    operations about them

also advocated by Rudolf Carnap 1932/1959 p.62-63:
   In the case of many words, specifically in the case of the overwhelming
   majority of scientific words, it is possible to specify their meaning by
   reduction to other words ("constitution," definition). E.g.,
   "'arthropodes' are animals with segmented bodies and jointed legs."
   ... In this way every word of the language is reduced to other words and
   finally to the words which occur in the so-called "observation
   sentences" or "protocol sentences."

[part of a larger argument stating that "the thing x is an arthropode" is
"deducible from premises of the form 'x is an animal,' 'x has a segmented
body,' 'x has jointed legs' ..." ultimately reducible to the senses]

[AM (tangential remark):
Clearly, the Carnapian reduction is not completely specified.  only some
aspects of the composition are highlighted.  eg. the phrase "criminal law"
may mean laws which are criminal (e.g. slavery laws) etc.  Also, "criminal
lawyer" - where it has fused into a single unit:
    Ram Jethmalani is an immoral lawyer
    Ram Jethmalani is a criminal lawyer]

Contents

Introduction

1  Concepts and Cognitive Science :  Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis 3

Part I: Origins of the Contemporary Study of Concepts

The Classical Theory

2  Euthyphro :  Plato 87
3  The Process of Concept Attainment :  Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow and
	George Austin 101
4  On the General Character of Semantic Theory :  Jerrold Katz 125

Philosophical Skepticism about the Classical Theory

5  Two Dogmas of Empiricism :  W. V. O. Quine 153
6  Philosophical Investigations, sections 65-78 :  Ludwig Wittgenstein 171

The Probabilistic Turn: Stereotypes, Prototypes, Exemplars

7  Is Semantics Possible? :  Hilary Putnam 177
8  Principles of Categorization :  Eleanor Rosch 189
9  The Exemplar View :  Edward Smith and Douglas Medin 207

Critical Reactions to the Probabilistic Turn

10 What Some Concepts Might Not Be :  Sharon Lee Armstrong,
	Lila R. Gleitman and Henry Gleitman 225
11 On the Adequacy of Prototype Theory as a Theory of Concepts :
	Daniel N. Osherson and Edward E. Smith 261
12  Concepts and Stereotypes :  Georges Rey 279

Part II Current Theories and Research

Neoclassical Theories

13  What Is a Concept, That a Person May Grasp It? :  Ray Jackendoff 305
14  Précis of A Study of Concepts :  Christopher Peacocke 335
15  Resisting Primitive Compulsions :  Georges Rey 339
16  Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts? :  Christopher Peacocke 345

Rethinking Prototypes

17  Combining Prototypes: A Selective Modification Model :  Edward E. Smith,
	Daniel N. Osherson, Lance J. Rips and Margaret Keane 355
18  Cognitive Models and Prototype Theory :  George Lakoff 391

Theory-Theory

19  The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence :  Gregory Murphy and
	Douglas Medin 425
20  Knowledge Acquisition: Enrichment or Conceptual Change? :  Susan Carey 459

Conceptual Atomism

21  Against Definitions :  Jerry A. Fodor, Merrill F. Garrett, Edward
	C. T. Walker and Cornelia H. Parkes 491
22  Information and Representation :  Jerry Fodor 513
23  A Common Structure for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs and Real Kinds:
	More Mama, More Milk and More Mouse :  Ruth Garrett Millikan  525
24  How to Acquire a Concept :  Eric Margolis 549

Concept Possession in Infants and Children

25  The Object Concept Revisited: New Directions in the Investigation of
	Infants' Physical Knowledge :  Renée Baillargeon 571
26  Insides and Essences: Early Understandings of the Non-Obvious :  Susan
    A. Gelman and Henry M. Wellman 613